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I. INTRODUCTION
Homosexuality refers to relations between men or between women who experience an
exclusive or predominant sexual attraction toward persons of the same sex. It has taken
a great variety of forms through the centuries and in different cultures. Its
psychological genesis remains largely unexplained. Basing itself on Sacred Scripture,
which presents homosexual acts as acts of grave depravity, tradition has always
declared that "homosexual acts are intrinsically disordered." They are contrary to the
natural law. They close the sexual act to the gift of life. They do not proceed from a
genuine affective and sexual complementarity. Under no circumstances can they be
approved.'
The Catholic Church remains, like so many institutions,
troubled by its inability to explain the origins of homosexuality. In the
face of its confusion, the Church has justified continuing
condemnation of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals as living in opposition
to "natural law." It was the Church itself, led by figures such as
Augustine, that popularized a natural law outlook in medieval
Western society and originated the view that engaging in sexual
1. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 2357 (Doubleday 2003) (citations omitted),
available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s2c2a6.htm#2357.
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activity is immoral unless it occurs within the confines of marriage to
an opposite-sex partner and for the purpose of procreation. 2  A
significant proportion of Americans today share this "natural law"
stance; a majority, while eschewing a distinction between procreative
and nonprocreative sex, disapprove of homosexual sex under any
circumstances. 3  Such views can be justified in part because
homosexuality's "genesis remains largely unexplained" despite the fact
that various disciplines, including biology, psychology, and sociology,
have had more than one hundred years to wrestle with the issue. 4 The
inability to answer these questions, however, stems more from
cultural assumptions and biases rooted in the United States' Judeo-
Christian tradition,5 which obscure genuine scientific understanding.
These biases have also played a role in the development of our legal
tradition, although it was not until the last century that legislators in
many jurisdictions shifted their focus from general sexual immorality
to the regulation of homosexual conduct. 6 This shift corresponded
with the "invention" of homosexuality as a "distinct category of
person."
7
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court held that the
Constitution protects private, consensual, homosexual conduct.8 The
petitioners in that case made a tactical decision to argue for the
unconstitutionality of Texas' sodomy laws by relying on the right to
2. See, e.g., JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX, AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE
587 (1987) ("Virtually all restrictions that now apply to sexual behavior in Western societies
stem from moral convictions enshrined in medieval canonical jurisprudence."); ALAN M.
DERSHOWITZ, SHOUTING FIRE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN A TURBULENT AGE 10-11 (2002) (introducing
the natural law perspective and discussing Augustine's theory that "[a]ll nature is good").
3. LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS AND
DEVELOPMENTS tbl.8-20 (3d ed. 2003). It also speaks to modern sentiment That citizens of
eleven states overwhelmingly approved various amendments to their respective states'
constitutions banning gay marriage, bringing the total number of states with some sort of ban to
forty-one, also speaks to modern anti-gay sentiment. Sarah Kershaw, Constitutional Bans on
Same-Sex Marriage Gain Widespread Support in 10 States, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2004, at P9; Todd
Purdum; An Electoral Affirmation of Shared Values, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004, at Al.
4. See, e.g., DAVID F. GREENBERG, THE CONSTRUCTION OF HOMOSEXUALITY 400-04 (1988)
(discussing the medicalization of homosexual behavior in the latter half of the nineteenth
century and later scientific inquiry into the origins of homosexuality).
5. Id.
6. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568 (2003) ("At the outset it should be noted that
there is no longstanding history in this country of laws directed at homosexual conduct as a
distinct matter.").
7. Id.; see also GREENBERG, supra note 4, at 397-404. The medicalization of homosexuality
in the late nineteenth century corresponded with passage of the first laws in England and the
United States specifically outlawing homosexual acts. Id.
8. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-7.
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privacy embedded in the substantive due process guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 9 Given the development of the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence in this area, and in particular the predilections
of the more moderate members of the Court, this was probably the
wisest course, and it achieved the desired result. Yet our nation's
efforts to exclude gays 10 from the protections afforded other groups in
the context of civil rights, marriage, and, until recently, consensual
sexual relations, also violate the Constitution's Establishment Clause.
It is upon this basis that questions regarding the status of gays should
ultimately be resolved if gays are to achieve full personhood under the
law.
Part II of this Note describes the Court's past and present
approaches to the status of gays, highlighting the profound shift that
occurred in Lawrence. Part III explores the Court's somewhat
convoluted establishment jurisprudence and argues for Lemon's
survival through modification. Part IV asserts that Judeo-Christian
morality, while an important part of our cultural traditions and a
powerful force in our legal thinking, is an illegitimate foundation upon
which to build a stable legal regime, especially in light of the
Establishment Clause.
Since Muller v. Oregon," the Supreme Court has entertained
so-called "Brandeis briefs," documents containing data and other
information to help the Court achieve a reasoned result.12
Accordingly, Part V examines scientific research regarding
homosexuality and homosexual behavior, which reveals that the line
between gay and straight is much more tenuous than antigay
advocates would claim, undercutting the "otherness" of gays and
further delegitimizing arguments that they should be denied full
personhood under the law. Finally, Part VI asserts that a context-
specific modification of the Lemon test applied in the face of legislation
motivated solely or primarily by moral concerns serves as a more
legitimate ground for decisionmaking than substantive due process,
which, while effective in protecting privacy, may need to be expanded
significantly by courts to strike down antigay marriage legislation and
9. Id. at 564-65, 572-74. The Court first utilized substantive due process to protect
individual privacy rights in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
10. For conciseness, this Note uses the term "gays" to refer to gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgendered individuals.
11. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
12. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 209-10 (1987) (discussing the
"Brandeis briefs" and noting that the briefs emphasized statistics and commission reports more
than judicial precedents).
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ensure gays full civil rights. Although much of the Supreme Court's
substantive due process jurisprudence discusses the illegitimacy of
naked morality as a basis for law, 13 such assertions function at the
periphery of the clause's core individual liberty concerns. An
establishment approach provides a more logical, stable, and legitimate
answer to the issues of gay marriage and civil rights waiting over the
horizon.
II. THE LAW OF HOMOSEXUALITY: THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS
Laws regarding homosexuality have traditionally derived much
of their legitimacy from a majoritarian interest in upholding
traditional morals. While other groups traditionally "targeted" by the
majority (e.g. racial minorities, women, the disabled) have been
accorded certain rights, gays have remained comfortably "other."
14
Today, discrimination against gays differs in at least two important
respects from race and sex discrimination. First, although federal
laws prohibit various forms of discrimination based on race and sex,
15
no law explicitly protects homosexuals. 16 In fact, the U.S. government
maintains policies that actively discriminate on the basis of sexual
preference. In 1996, for example, Congress passed the Defense of
Marriage Act, which denies federal recognition of same-sex marriages
and permits the states to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages
performed in other states. 17 In the same year, Congress refused to
13. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-74, 576 (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)).
14. See, e.g., GREENBERG, supra note 4, at 1-21.
15. Aside from the Civil War Amendments, the most famous example is the Civil Rights of
Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a et seq. (2003).
16. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN AND THOMAS WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING
AMERICA: RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND JUSTICE 696 (4th ed., 2001).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2003) states that:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other
State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the
same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2003) provides:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United
States, the word "marriage" means only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife, and the word "spouse" refers only to a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.
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extend the remedies of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to sexual
orientation. 18
Second, while Americans' views about African-Americans and
women have changed substantially since the early 1970s, they have
remained remarkably consistent and negative with regard to gays. In
1974, more than a third of the population believed that interracial
marriages should be prohibited and that a woman's job was to take
care of the home.19 By 2000 those figures had fallen to around 10
percent and 15 percent, respectively. 20  In 1974, 75.5 percent of
Americans believed that homosexual behavior was wrong. 21 By 2000,
that number was 63.3 percent. 22
A. Bowers v. Hardwick- Leviticus Reloaded
Until 2003, when the Supreme Court announced its decision in
Lawrence, the most influential of the Court's gay rights decisions was
Bowers v. Hardwick.23 In Bowers, the Court held, in line with popular
sentiment, that the Constitution did not protect homosexual conduct.
24
The Court rejected the petitioner's privacy argument and upheld the
Georgia antisodomy law at issue in the case, asserting that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not grant "a
fundamental right [to] homosexuals to engage in sodomy." 2
5
In announcing the decision, Justice White argued that
"[p]roscriptions against [homosexual] conduct have ancient roots,"
pointing out that "[slodomy was a criminal offense at common law and
was forbidden by the laws of the original 13 States." 26  In his
18. EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 16 at 770-71.
19. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, tbls.8-10, 8-14.
20. Id.
21. Id. tbl.8-20.
22. Id. (reporting that 63.3 percent of Americans responded "always" or "almost always" to
the question, "Do you believe that sexual relations between two adults of the same sex is always
wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?"). Some researchers
believe that Americans' views towards homosexuality can be best described as homophobic-
characterized by a strong, irrational fear of homosexuals and fixed negative attitudes and
reactions to homosexuals. See, e.g., B. Fyfe, "Homophobia" or Homosexual Bias Reconsidered, 12
ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 549, 549-50 (1983). Although many Americans have anti-gay
feelings that are strong enough to equate to a phobia, negative attitudes and prejudiced
behaviors are more common; a more appropriate term may be anti-gay prejudice.
23. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
24. Id. at 189.
25. Id. at 190.
26. Id. at 192.
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concurrence, Chief Justice Burger emphasized the propriety of the
Court's holding by reference to a moral and historical perspective:
Condemnation of [homosexual] practices is firmly rooted in Judaeo-Christian [sic] moral
and ethical standards. Homosexual sodomy was a capital crime under Roman law.
During the English Reformation when powers of the ecclesiastical courts were
transferred to the King's Courts, the first English statute criminalizing sodomy was
passed. Blackstone described "the infamous crime against nature" as an offense of
"deeper malignity" than rape, a heinous act "the very mention of which is a disgrace to
human nature," and "a crime not fit to be named."
2 7
Chief Justice Burger went on to assert that "[t]o hold that the act of
homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right
would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching. ' 28 What the
Justices failed to note, of course, was that these "ancient"
proscriptions on sodomy in England applied equally to both women
and men, and were not enacted with regard to gays specifically.
29
The "millennia of moral teaching" in Western culture to which
Chief Justice Burger referred, and to which Justice White alluded,
stem primarily from religious traditions. Opponents of the "gay-rights
agenda" often cite Biblical authority to support their arguments.
There are two important explicit references to homosexual activity in
the Bible. The first occurs in Leviticus, which declares that for a man
to "lie with a male as with a woman... is an abomination" and that
both men who have engaged in such an act "shall be put to death. ' 30
The second reference is the Apostle Paul's discussion of same-sex
intercourse in Romans, in which he cites homosexuality to prove gross
and deliberate sin on the part of Gentiles against God's truth
accessible in creation or nature. 31 Despite the Justices' extensive
discussion of morality, however, the legal focus in the case was (at
least ostensibly) on the so-called "right to privacy," originally
articulated in Griswold v. Connecticut. 32
B. Romer v. Evans: A Foot in the Door
Ten years after its decision in Bowers, the Court began to
acknowledge the possible legitimacy of gay rights in the
groundbreaking case Romer v. Evans.33 Authored by Justice Kennedy,
27. Id. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
28. Id. at 197.
29. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568 (2003).
30. Leviticus 18:22, 20:13 (New Revised Standard Version).
31. Romans 1:24-27 (New Revised Standard Version).
32. 381 U.S. 479, 483-486 (1965).
33. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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the majority opinion declared that an amendment to the Colorado
state constitution prohibiting local governments from protecting gays
from discrimination violated the Equal Protection Clause. 34 The
amendment had been adopted by a statewide initiative that arose in
response to local laws passed by communities such as Boulder, Aspen,
and Denver giving sexual orientation the same protected status as
race and gender. 35 The Court held the statute lacked a rational
relationship to legitimate state interests:
[T]he amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated
disability on a single named group.. . . Second, its sheer breadth is so discontinuous
with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but
animus toward the class that it affects.
3 6
Justice Kennedy also noted "the constitution 'neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens.' ",37
Justice Scalia's dissent in Romer focused in large part on the
right of Coloradoans to enact legislation expressing traditional sexual
morality. He described the state constitutional amendment at issue
as an attempt "to preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts
of a politically powerful minority to revise those mores," and compared
homosexuality to "murder, for example, or polygamy, or cruelty to
animals" as conduct deserving of "animus.'' 38 He went on to argue
that "moral disapproval of homosexual conduct, the same sort of moral
disapproval that produced the centuries-old criminal laws that we
held constitutional in Bowers.. ." was an appropriate basis for the
legislation at issue. 39
Although Romer appears to represent Justice Kennedy's first
step towards the reasoning that would lead to his opinion in Lawrence,
his treatment of gay rights traces back to a 1980 decision he wrote
while sitting on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In Belier v.
34. Id. at 626-36. The Colorado amendment stated:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of
its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt
or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or
bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise
be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority
status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of
the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b.
35. Id. at 623-24.
36. Id. at 632.
37. Id. at 623 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
38. Id. at 636, 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Middendorf, that court held that the Navy's decision to discharge
individuals for engaging in homosexual conduct was appropriate. 40 In
language foreshadowing Lawrence, however, Kennedy wrote:
We recognize, as we must, that there is substantial academic comment which argues
that the choice to engage in homosexual action is a personal decision entitled, at least in
some instances, to recognition as a fundamental right and to full protection as an aspect
of the individual's right of privacy.
4 1
He went on to note that "[u]pholding the challenged regulations as
constitutional is distinct from a statement that they are wise."
42
Indeed, Kennedy emphasized the context-specific nature of the
decision, citing the "needs of the military, the Navy in particular."43
This sort of thinking would come to its full fruition twenty-three years
later in Lawrence v. Texas.
C. Lawrence v. Texas: Leviticus Overruled
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence declared
unconstitutional a Texas statute criminalizing certain intimate sexual
conduct between two persons of the same sex. 44 Specifically, the
opinion stated that as consenting adults, petitioners were free to
engage in private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the
Due Process Clause.45 In announcing its decision, the Court explicitly
overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, noting that:
[T]he Court in Bowers was making the ... point that for centuries there have been
powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral. The condemnation has
been shaped by religious beliefs .... These considerations do not answer the question
before us, however. The issue is whether the majority may use the power of the State to
enforce these views on the whole society through operation of the criminal law.
4 6
The Court, then, decided that laws motivated solely by moral concerns
fail to overcome citizens' right to privacy, first articulated in Griswold
v. Connecticut47 and expanded in Eisenstadt v. Baird48 and Roe v.
Wade,49 among other cases.
40. 632 F.2d 788, 792 (1980).
41. Id. at 809.
42. Id. at 812.
43. Id.
44. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562-79 (2003).
45. Id. at 560-74.
46. Id. at 571.
47. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding that a law prohibiting the use of contraceptives
violated a married couple's right to privacy).
563
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Justice O'Connor's concurrence focused on the Equal Protection
Clause, rather than on privacy concerns. 50 The majority had avoided
this approach, fearing that laws prohibiting sodomy between both
same-sex and opposite-sex partners might be found valid under such a
reading. 51 According to Justice O'Connor, the issue in Lawrence was
"whether, under the Equal Protection Clause, moral disapproval is a
legitimate state interest to justify by itself a statute that bans
homosexual sodomy, but not heterosexual sodomy."52 Citing Romer,
Justice O'Connor argued that the rational basis approach did not
protect a desire to restrict the right of an unpopular group and that
such a desire was not a legitimate state interest. 53 She noted that "we
have never held that moral disapproval, without any other asserted
state interest, is a sufficient rationale under the Equal protection
Clause to justify a law that discriminates among groups of persons."
54
Although both Justice Kennedy and Justice O'Connor asserted
that naked morality is illegitimate as a source of law, neither Justice
framed this conclusion in terms of the Establishment Clause, despite
the fact that a law criminalizing homosexual behavior tends to
"establish" Judeo-Christian religious morality as governing every
citizen's conduct (at least with regard to sexuality). An examination of
the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence reveals that, despite
its complexities, laws restricting the rights of gays plainly violate the
terms of the First Amendment.
III. THE LAW OF RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT: A CENTURY OF
CONFUSION
Although the Supreme Court began its attempts to interpret
the Establishment Clause in 1899, now, more than a hundred years
later, the Court has yet to develop a coherent jurisprudence. As one
scholar has explained, "[flrom a lawyer's point of view, the
Establishment Clause is the most frustrating part of First
48. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (finding that the right to privacy prevents governmental
intrusion into decisions about the use of contraceptives for both married and unmarried
individuals.
49. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) ('This right of privacy ...... is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.").
50. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 574-75 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 582 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 579-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632
(1996)).
54. Id. at 582 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Amendment law. The cases are an impossible tangle of divergent
doctrines and seemingly conflicting results."55 More recent case law,
however, indicates that the Court has an opportunity to bring stability
to its remarkably inconsistent case law.
A. Initial Attempts
The Supreme Court's first Establishment Clause dispute,
Bradfield v. Roberts, involved a government appropriation to a
hospital operated by Roman Catholic nuns.56  The Justices
unanimously upheld the statute, finding little relevance in the fact
that Catholic nuns administered the hospital; it was the purpose of
the facility, they held, that was important.5 7 Because the hospital's
purpose was secular, rather than religious, it withstood constitutional
scrutiny.58 Although the Court did not announce a bright line test to
apply in future establishment cases, the "secular purpose"
requirement first articulated in Bradfield has remained an important
principle in the Court's later establishment jurisprudence.
About fifty years passed between the Supreme Court's decision
in Bradfield and the next important establishment case, Everson v.
Board of Education.59 Arch Everson, a taxpayer, had challenged the
local school board's reimbursement of transportation expenses for
parents sending their children to Catholic schools. 60 He argued that
this money served to support religion in violation of the Establishment
Clause. 61 The Court, in announcing its decision, recognized that the
Establishment Clause means that neither a state nor the federal
government "can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another."62 Nevertheless, the outcome was
accommodationist: the Court held that while a state may not
contribute tax dollars directly to a religious institution because such
support would violate the Establishment Clause, a state must also
protect its citizens' rights under the Free Exercise Clause, and "cannot
hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own religion." 63 The
55. DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 275 (1998).
56. 175 U.S. 291, 298-300 (1899).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
60. Id. at 3-4.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 15.
63. Id. at 16.
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Court declared the township's bussing program constitutional because
the First Amendment "requires the state to be a neutral in its
relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does
not require the state to be their adversary."64
Even though Justice Black's majority opinion in Everson
permitted the funding program at issue, it "constitutionalized" an
interpretation of Madison and Jefferson's philosophies that supports a
clear division between religious institutions and government. 65
Indeed, Black quoted Jefferson's comment that the clause was
intended to build "a wall of separation between Church and State."66
This view of the church-state relationship would play an important
role in later decisions. For example, in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
Board of Education, the Court held that a time-release program in
which religious instructors provided weekly religious training in a
public school violated the Establishment Clause because the state was
thereby providing "invaluable aid" to religion. 67 And in Engel v.
Vitale, the Court held that daily classroom recitation of a
denominationally neutral, state-composed prayer violated the
Establishment Clause, even though students could be excused from
participation. 68 Government, the Court said, may not be in the
prayer-writing business. 69
Similarly, the Supreme Court held that daily Bible reading and
class recitation of the Lord's Prayer offended the Constitution in
Abington Township v. Schempp.70 The Court reached this result even
though no child was compelled to participate and the religious
observance was "nondenominational. '" 71 The Court stated that the
Establishment Clause does not allow a "religious program carried on
by government." 72 The Court also articulated in Schempp, for the first
time, two prongs of the present three-prong Lemon test for
determining whether a government action violates the Establishment
Clause, observing that public school prayer does not have (1) a secular
64. Id. at 18.
65. Id. at 11-16.
66. Id. at 16.
67. 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948).
68. 370 U.S. 421, 430-33 (1962).
69. Id. at 432.
70. 374 U.S. 203, 203 (1963).
71. Id. at 224-26. The notion that the "nondenominational" nature of the religious exercises
would spare them from the reach of the Establishment Clause is a remarkably parochial
argument, since freedom of religion obviously extends beyond the various sects of Christianity.
72. Id. at 221 (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962)).
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legislative purpose or (2) a primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion.
73
B. Walz, Lemon, and the Aftermath
In Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York, the court
changed its approach to establishment issues.74 The case concerned
the property tax exemptions enjoyed by religious institutions. 75 Walz
contended that the tax exemptions resulted in property owners
making involuntary contributions to churches in violation of the
Establishment Clause. 76 The opinion began predictably enough given
the Abington precedent, with an examination of the "purpose" prong.77
But rather than proceeding to analyze whether the law advanced or
inhibited religion, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority,
asserted: "Determining that the legislative purpose of [a] tax
exemption is not aimed at establishing, sponsoring, or supporting
religion does not end the inquiry, however. We must also be sure that
the end result - the effect - is not an excessive government
entanglement with religion."78 Burger went on to hold that property
tax exemptions did not constitute an excessive entanglement with
religion. 7
9
Walz, while modifying the Abington standard, did not appear to
articulate a new test. Indeed, Burger's reinterpretation of the "effect"
prong of Abington seemed to further confuse the Supreme Court's
establishment jurisprudence; however, in Lemon v. Kurtzman,8 0 the
Court articulated a test that, while battered, survives to this day.
Under Lemon, there are three principal criteria a court should use to
determine whether a state legislative enactment comports with the
Establishment Clause: (1) whether the statute has a secular
legislative purpose, (2) whether the principal or primary effect of the
statute is neither to advance nor to inhibit religion, and (3) whether
the statute fosters an excessive government entanglement with
religion.8' None of these prongs, of course, were new-the Court had
73. Id. at 222.
74. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
75. Id. at 666.
76. Id. at 667.
77. Id. at 672-73.
78. Id. at 674 (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 674-80.
80. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
81. Id. at 612-13.
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articulated them in earlier cases. The Lemon test finds its roots in
prior Supreme Court holdings based at least in part on a belief that
Madison and Jefferson had envisioned a strict wall of separation
between church and state; the Court in Lemon, then, seemed to
indicate that it was not only following precedent but reinforcing its
traditional understanding of the values from which that precedent
came.
82
The current Court has made it plain that the Lemon test may
not be the most appropriate standard to use in establishment cases,
and the Justices do not all agree with its historical basis. Alternative
approaches have been offered, as well as case-specific modifications of
Lemon.8 3 In Aguilar v. Felton, a 5-4 Court used the Lemon test to
strike down a program that provided for state-supported remedial
instruction of private school students.84 In the more recent case of
Agostini v. Felton, however, the Court utilized an accommodationist
interpretation of Lemon to hold that the Establishment Clause does
not bar a city from sending public school teachers into parochial
schools to provide education to disadvantaged children pursuant to a
congressionally-mandated program. 85 The Court noted that "[niot all
entanglements . . . have the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.
Interaction between church and state is inevitable, and we have
always tolerated some level of involvement between the two.
Entanglement must be 'excessive' before it runs afoul of the
Establishment Clause."86
In spite of the criticism it has received,8 7 the Lemon test
survives because the Court has yet to announce an alternative
standard. Several members of the Court have suggested various non-
Lemon grounds for deciding establishment cases, although none of
these approaches has supplanted Lemon's three-prong test. These
approaches are discussed below.
82. EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 16, at 147-49.
83. These modifications and alternatives are discussed infra Part II.B.
84. 473 U.S. 402, 412-13 (1985).
85. 521 U.S. 203, 230 (1997).
86. Id. at 233 (citations omitted).
87 EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 16, at 146-49.
[Vol. 58:2:555568
2005] ESTABLISHMENT THEORY OF GAY PERSONHOOD 569
C. Alternatives to Lemon
1. Nonpreferentialism
In Wallace v. Jaffree, a father with students in the public
school system brought an action against the local school board and
other public officials, arguing that state-mandated "moments of
silence" in the public schools violated the Establishment Clause.88
The Supreme Court, applying the Lemon test, found for the father,
holding that the statute providing for silent meditation intended to
convey a message of state approval of prayer in the public schools.8 9
The Court stated, "[Alabama's] endorsement is not consistent with the
established principle that the government must pursue a course of
complete neutrality toward religion."90 The majority also asserted:
Just as the right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary
components of a broader concept of individual freedom of mind, so also the individual's
freedom to choose his own creed is the counterpart of his right to refrain from accepting
the creed established by the majority. At one time it was thought that this right merely
proscribed the preference of one Christian sect over another, but would not require
equal respect for the conscience of the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a non-
Christian faith such as Islam or Judaism. But when the underlying principle has been
examined in the crucible of litigation, the Court has unambiguously concluded that the
individual freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the right
to select any religious faith or none at all.9 1
Then-Justice Rehnquist dissented and argued that "[t]he
framers intended the Establishment Clause to prohibit the
designation of any church as a 'national' one. The Clause was also
designed to stop the Federal Government from asserting a preference
for one religious denomination or sect over others. '92 He argued that a
generalized endorsement of "prayer time" could not, then, violate the
Establishment Clause. 93  Justice Rehnquist's nonpreferentialism
standard as articulated in Wallace, however, rested on an
unacceptably narrow view of religious freedom. As applied, the
standard would permit "nonsectarian" activity-such as the recitation
of a prayer at a middle school graduation 94 -that would harm not only
88. 472 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1985).
89. Id. at 55-60.
90. Id. at 60.
91. Id. at 52-53 (citations omitted).
92. Id. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
93. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
94 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631-32 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In this case,
Chief Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Scalia's opinion, which dissented from the Court's holding
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those who chose not to embrace any religious creed but also those who
embraced a faith that did not include prayer. What Rehnquist failed
to appreciate in articulating his nonpreferentialism standard, in the
end, is that so-called nondenominational religious observances often
violate the Establishment Clause in that many sects' beliefs do not
involve activities like prayer 95 or other traditionally Judeo-Christian
conceptions. As such, nonpreferentialism is more appropriately
applied as a corollary to the traditional Lemon prongs than as a stand-
alone test.
2. Endorsement Approach to Lemon
Justice O'Connor has suggested a modified Lemon test in
several concurrences. The Establishment Clause, she argues, forbids
the government from making "religion relevant to a person's standing
in the political community."96 Under her view, Lemon's inquiry
regarding the (1) purpose and (2) effect of a statute would require
courts to determine "whether government's purpose is to endorse
religion and whether the statute actually conveys a message of
endorsement."97 A government action endorsing "religion or a
particular religious practice" is unconstitutional under her approach
"because it 'sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders,
not full members of the political community, and an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the
political community.' "98 The Court has adopted Justice O'Connor's
endorsement analysis and applied it in various Establishment Clause
decisions. 99
that the Establishment Clause prohibited an invocation and benediction at a middle school
graduation ceremony. Id. As Justice Scalia explained,
In holding that the Establishment Clause prohibits invocations and benedictions at
public school graduation ceremonies, the Court-with nary a mention that it is doing
so - lays waste a tradition that is as old as public school graduation ceremonies
themselves, and that is a component of an even more longstanding American tradition
of nonsectarian prayer to God at public celebrations generally.
Id. As the dissenting opinion demonstrates, Rehnquist's nonpreferentialism would permit
prayer at public events, even those involving schoolchildren.
95. i.e., Yahweh Elohim.
96. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
97. Id.
98. Id. (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)).
99. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94 (1989) ('The Establishment
Clause, at the very least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on questions of
religious belief or from 'making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's
standing in the political community.' ") (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J.,
[Vol. 58:2:555570
2005] ESTABLISHMENT THEORY OF GAY PERSONHOOD 571
3. Coercion
Justice Kennedy, concurring and dissenting in County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, argued that:
Our cases disclose two limiting principles: government may not coerce anyone to support
or participate in any religion or its exercise; and it may not, in the guise of avoiding
hostility or callous indifference, give direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it in
fact "establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.
'100
Kennedy applied his coercion analysis in Lee v. Weisman, where the
Court held a graduation benediction unconstitutional on
establishment grounds. 101 While Justice Kennedy utilized his coercion
test as a rationale; Weisman did not overrule the Lemon test. 10 2
D. Zelman: Brave New World?
One of the Supreme Court's most recent establishment cases
was Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.03 At issue was an Ohio school
voucher program designed to provide tuition aid for students in the
Cleveland City School District to attend a participating public or
private school of their parents' choosing. 0 4  In holding that the
program did not violate the Establishment Clause, the Court, in an
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, emphasized the neutrality of the
Ohio law-students could attend religious or nonreligious schools-as
well as the key fact that, as in Everson, the "primary beneficiaries" of
the aid were children rather than sectarian schools. 0 5 Although Chief
Justice Rehnquist relied on his nonpreferentialism standard in
emphasizing the Ohio law's neutrality, he refused to dispose of the
Lemon test, citing it with approval and incorporating his standard into
it.106 To do so, he applied a "subtest" under the "effect" prong of
Lemon applicable in the specific instance of an indirect aid case.
Specifically, the Court held that courts must:
[C]onsider two factors [under the "effect" prong]: first, whether the program administers
aid in a neutral fashion, without differentiation based on the religious status of
beneficiaries or providers of services; second, and more importantly, whether
concurring)).
100. 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Lynch, 465
U.S. at 678).
101. 505 U.S. 577, 592-97 (1992).
102. Id. at 587.
103. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
104. Id. at 643-48.
105. Id. at 649-51.
106. Id. at 668-70.
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beneficiaries of indirect aid have a genuine choice among religious and nonreligious
organizations when determining the organization to which they will direct that aid. 
10 7
Chief Justice Rehnquist supported his "subtest" by referencing
Everson, in which the Supreme Court held that the "[First]
Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with
groups of religious believers and non-believers .... ,"108
E. Where Do We Go From Here?
Despite the confusion that exists in the Supreme Court's
establishment jurisprudence, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in
Zelman suggests an approach for future establishment cases. Given
the Court's inability to apply Lemon consistently, some may question
its survival. The Court has shown no signs, however, that it intends
to overrule that decision. Instead, the Court seems intent on
modifying the basic standard through the other approaches
discussed-nonpreferentialism, endorsement, and coercion. Zelman
suggests these approaches need not compete with Lemon; instead,
they can be incorporated into the test as "subtests" or "sub-prongs."
The Court's inconsistent application of Lemon, while frustrating, may
merely reflect the complexity of this area of the law. Context-specific
"subtests" that guide Lemon's application may be a more appropriate,
stable guide for courts and lawyers that could eventually achieve
equilibrium in establishment jurisprudence.
The situation of gays in the United States provides a perfect
opportunity for the application of such a context-specific approach to
Lemon. Although the Court already has asserted gays' right to engage
in homosexual conduct (at least in the privacy of their homes),10 9 gays
are denied full personhood in society and are unable to enjoy many of
the rights granted their heterosexual counterparts. For example,
marriage provides, by one estimate, 1,049 distinct rights,
responsibilities, and benefits under federal law alone. 110 Only one
state expressly permits gay marriage.111 Thirty-seven states have
107. Id. at 669.
108. Id. (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947)) (quotations
omitted).
109. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 562, 579 (2003).
110. Jill Schachner Chanen, The Changing Face of Gay Legal Issues, A.B.A. J., July 2004, at
48.
111. In Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), the Massachusetts
Supreme Court held that the state's marriage licensing statute, forbidding same-sex couples
from marrying, violated the Massachusetts Constitution. Specifically, the statute denied gays
the protection of the constitution's individual liberty and equality safeguards. In Opinion of the
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enacted laws specifically prohibiting gay marriage. 112 Objections to
such unions are invariably religiously motivated. In the wake of the
Massachusetts Supreme Court decision approving gay marriage,
President George W. Bush, at a White House Rose Garden news
conference, used a question about his views on homosexuality to
assert:
I am mindful that we're all sinners... [a]nd I caution those who may try to take the
speck out of their neighbor's eye when they got a log in their own. I think it's very
important for our society to respect each individual, to welcome those with good hearts,
to be a welcoming country. .. . On the other hand, that does not mean that somebody
like me needs to compromise on issues such as marriage. And that's really where the
issue is headed here in Washington, and that is the definition of marriage. I believe
marriage is between a man and a woman, and I believe we ought to codify that one way
or the other and we have lawyers looking at the best way to do that.
1 13
Wearing his religious beliefs on his sleeve, and paraphrasing
Jesus's admonition in Matthew that begins, "[d]o not judge, so that
you may not be judged,"'1 4 President Bush prefaced his staunchly
antigay views with an expression of New Testament tolerance. The
religiously-motivated nature of his Old Testament policy position,
however, is difficult to ignore.
A day after the President's conference, the Vatican announced
that support for gay marriage was "gravely immoral," and stated
unequivocally that "[miarriage is holy, while homosexual acts go
against the natural moral law."115  Several months earlier,
Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 570-71 (Mass. 2004), the Massachusetts Supreme Court
held that only "marriage," as opposed to "civil unions," effectuates the requirements of the
Massachusetts Constitution.
[T]he government [may not], under the guise of protecting 'traditional' values, even if
they be the traditional values of the majority, enshrine in law an invidious
discrimination that our Constitution ... forbids.
The dissimilitude between the terms 'civil marriage' and 'civil union' is not
innocuous; it is a considered choice of language that reflects a demonstrable assigning
of same-sex, largely homosexual, couples to second-class status.
Id. at 570.
112. Laurie Goodstein, Gay Couples Seek Unions in God's Eyes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2004, at
Al.
113. Neil A. Lewis, From the Rose Garden: Same-Sex Marriage; Bush Backs Bid to Block
Gays From Marrying, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2003, at Al.
114. Matthew 7:1 (New Revised Standard Version).
115. Frank Bruni, Vatican Exhorts Legislators to Reject Same-Sex Unions, N. Y. TIMES, Aug.
1, 2003, at Al (quoting CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, CONSIDERATIONS
REGARDING PROPOSALS TO GIVE LEGAL RECOGNITION TO UNIONS BETWEEN HOMOSEXUAL
PERSONS, available at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/ documents
/rccon_cfaithdoc_20030731 homosexual-unionsen.html).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:2:555
controversial United States Senator Rick Santorum, speaking to a
reporter regarding the Supreme Court's holding in Lawrence, stated
that if consensual gay sex is permissible, "then you have the right to
bigamy, you have the right to polygamy, you have the right to incest,
you have the right to adultery. You have the right to anything."'
116
In January 2004, President Bush, after discussing the virtues
of abstinence, announced during his State of the Union speech:
A strong America must also value the institution of marriage. I believe we should
respect individuals as we take a principled stand for one of the most fundamental,
enduring institutions of our civilization. Congress has already taken a stand on this
issue by passing the Defense of Marriage Act, signed in 1996 by President Clinton. That
statute protects marriage under federal law as the union of a man and a woman, and
declares that one state may not redefine marriage for other states. Activist judges,
however, have begun redefining marriage by court order, without regard for the will of
the people and their elected representatives. On an issue of such great consequence, the
people's voice must be heard. If judges insist on forcing their arbitrary will upon the
people, the only alternative left to the people would be the constitutional process. Our
nation must defend the sanctity of marriage. The outcome of this debate is important-
and so is the way we conduct it. The same moral tradition that defines marriage also
teaches that each individual has dignity and value in God's sight.
11 7
In light of President Bush's earlier comments, it came as no
surprise when, on February 24, 2004, he announced his explicit
support for a constitutional amendment banning gay marriage.1 8
Legal scholarship is not devoid of impassioned arguments for
the divinely-ordained nature of marriage. Professor Kohm asserts:
I do sincerely believe that human kind can come to understand what the Divine Creator
truly intended for our lives. . . . [M]arriage . . . is indeed not a state-established
institution. .. . [B]efore any government graced the face of the earth, there was a...
commitment to the intentional union of a man and a woman as one flesh - a
marriage.ll9
Asserting that recourse to natural law is appropriate for those who
have "a proper understanding of natural law, or a proper
understanding of The Creator of that law," Professor Kohm went on to
argue that "[t]here remains a correct truth, an absolute, a divine
truth, that can be determined when individuals personally know and
understand The Creator. '
120
116. Associated Press, G.O.P. Senator's Remark on Gays Draws Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21,
2003, at A21.
117. State of the Union; President's State of the Union Message to Congress and the Nation,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2004, at A18 (emphases added).
118. Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Backs Amendment to Ban Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25,
2004, at Al.
119. Lynne Marie Kohm, A Reply to "Principles and Prejudice': Marriage and The
Realization that Principles Win Over Political Will, 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 293, 312 (1996).
120. Id. at 313.14.
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So-called natural law and corresponding Judeo-Christian
traditions are not, however, an appropriate foundation upon which to
rest the law. While Western morality inspired many of the rules and
doctrines imported from England at the founding of the Republic,
antigay laws reflect a particularly ethnocentric, religiously-based bias
that is unacceptable as a matter of modern jurisprudence or
governance. Laws targeting the personhood of gays are inexplicable
unless considered in light of our nation's Christian tradition.
IV. THE ILLEGITIMACY OF JUDEO-CHRISTIAN MORALITY AS A BASIS FOR
LAW
Traditional western morality provides at least part of the basis
for many of our oldest legal prohibitions. At first glance, this reality
appears to render untenable an argument that the Establishment
Clause invalidates laws discriminating against gays, since those laws
reflect Judeo-Christian values. Doesn't a law making murder a crime
stem from the same tradition ("you shall not murder"121)?
Oliver Wendell Holmes famously declared, "The life of the law
has not been logic; it has been experience."1 22 Legal scholars have
since debated the validity of Holmes's statement, as well as the
desirability of a legal system so conceived. Such debates often raise
very basic questions. What is the law? Where do rights come from? If
they do not come from God (or Allah, or Nature, etc.), from where do
they derive?
Humanity's basic questions regarding the nature of reality are
best answered through application of the scientific method. 23 The
scientific method cannot be applied to the law as such, of course;
however, given the scientific understanding that nature is morally
neutral, 24 the answers to our "source of law and rights" questions
become plain. The complex relationship between the "is" of nature
and the "ought" of morality must be mediated by human experience in
crafting and interpreting the law.
121. Exodus 20:13 (New Revised Standard Version). The commandment forbids murder, not
other forms of killing authorized for Israel, including war and capital punishment. Id. n. 13.
122. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (Dover Publ'ns. 1991) (1881).
123. This proposition is so obvious as to be beyond question. Nevertheless, there are still
those who argue for the superiority of divine revelation, astrology, or other forms of truth-
seeking. For a discussion of the development of the scientific method and its rightful place as the
primary means by which humanity should seek to answer its most basic questions, see generally
RICHARD DAWKINS, A DEVIL'S CHAPLAIN (2003); MICHAEL SHERMER, WHY PEOPLE BELIEVE
WEIRD THINGS: PSEUDOSCIENCE, SUPERSTITION, AND OTHER CONFUSIONS OF OUR TIME (1997).
124. RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 189-201 (Oxford Univ. Press 1989) (1976).
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A. Where Do Rights Come From?
Those who claim to speak in the name of God have often used
natural law or natural rights arguments as a tactic to serve partisan,
religious, or personal agendas. "Like a harlot, natural law is at the
disposal of everyone. The ideology does not exist that cannot be
defended by an appeal to the law of nature. '125
Rights are not natural. An examination of the length and
breadth and human history demonstrates that liberty is the exception,
not the rule. The norm has been curtailment, corruption,
arbitrariness, and authoritarianism. 126 Many nations today,
including, until recently, Iraq, could be so characterized. What is
needed, however, rather than reliance on natural law, is some other
foundation upon which to decide what laws are "right" and what
rights should be law. The vast majority of citizens, not to mention
politicians and judges, would be opposed to a strict legal positivist
approach. 127 Many scholars, perhaps most notably Ronald Dworkin,
have attempted to establish a middle ground between traditional
natural law arguments and the reductionism of legal positivism.
128
While Dworkin agrees with natural law advocates that rights must be
"discovered," rather than "invented," he argues such rights are part of
a "constructive model" which society builds, with the core principle
being that governments must treat all their citizens equally. 129 This
idea is a fundamental "postulate of political morality" from which all
basic rights flow. 130
B. Rights Come From Wrongs
131
Human experience provides the best argument for why society
should value certain rights. The difficulty is learning from the lessons
125. H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 163 (1983) (quoting ALF
Ross, ON LAW AND JUSTICE (1958)).
126. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 2, at 11-12 ("The history of mankind has been a history in
which the norm has almost always been authoritarianism, elitism, censorship, arbitrariness, and
denial of what he have come to call due process of law.").
127. See generally JUDICIAL POWER, DEMOCRACY AND LEGAL POSITIVISM (Tom Campbell &
Jeffrey Goldsworthy eds., 2000) (offering a general critique of the theory of legal positivism).
128. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 177-84 (1977).
129. Id. at 160, 177, 184.
130. Id. at 177.
131. See, e.g., DERSHOWITZ, supra note 2, at 33-34 ("Rights Come From Wrongs" is the title of
Chapter Two of Dershowitz's book. In this chapter, he posits, "[Wie can learn a considerable
amount about rights from the world's entirely untheoretical experiences of injustices.").
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of history with an eye towards the future. Judeo-Christian morality
suggests a top-down legal model: God says to do or not do something,
and we obey. Experiential morality represents, by contrast, a bottom-
up approach. 132 Building on the negative experiences of injustice and
the insights of science, we can advocate laws that have been shown to
serve as a check on injustice and arbitrariness while reflecting sound
public policy in terms of current scientific understanding. 133 This
bottom-up approach, then, has as its starting point a baseline
consensus (i.e., forcing others to hold certain religious beliefs or follow
certain religious practices is bad), based in the experiences of
injustice, while still leaving room for debate beyond that consensus
based in the truth-seeking mechanisms of the scientific method.
The following Section contains an examination of the current
scientific understanding of homosexuality, drawing from biology (and
its various subdisciplines), psychology, and sociology. This
examination provides support for an acknowledgement of gay
personhood rooted in our understanding of the reality of homosexual
behavior, absent ideology. Specialized areas of knowledge often
inform legal scholarship, and as such, the discussion that follows is
fairly technical.
V. HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR AS EVOLUTIONARY ADAPTATION
Sex provides for the continuation of life and is the means
through which "higher" organisms, such as humans, pass on their
genetic material, the raw material for evolution. 134 Yet research
focusing upon human sexuality is difficult to obtain. 135 Indeed, "the
scientific literature contains more articles on the genetics of eye color
in fruit flies than on the biology of human sexuality."'136 Moral
concerns, taboos, discomfort with the topic, and above all, politics,
have made research difficult. 37 Yet at the outset of the twenty-first
century, enough research into the origins of homosexuality exists for
an informed review.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 34.
134. DEAN HAMER & PETER COPELAND, THE SCIENCE OF DESIRE: THE SEARCH FOR THE GAY
GENE AND THE BIOLOGY OF BEHAVIOR 13 (1994).
135. See id. ("There are no federally supported sexuality research centers. Scientists and
academics who try to make a career out of analyzing sexuality find their way blocked by funding
sources and tenure committees."),
136. Id.
137. Id. at 13-14.
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Even in the literature that does address human sexuality,
however, biases are hard to overcome. For example, the traditional
concern with sex's reproductive function ignores the possible value of
nonconceptive sex. A rejection of the traditional gay-straight
dichotomy, coupled with a careful examination of homosexual
behavior among both humans and nonhuman primates, our close
genetic relatives, allows a more balanced view of the development of
sexual behavior in our species supported by empirical results and not
simply "armchair science." This Section will show that both exclusive
homosexuality and exclusive heterosexuality are culturally
constructed; while an exclusive homosexual orientation is maladaptive
in terms of reproductive success,138 homosexual behavior is adaptive in
that it has enhanced social interactions and served to decrease conflict
in the environment of evolutionary adaptation (EEA).13
9
A review of earlier conceptualizations of sexual orientation is in
order before presenting a detailed consideration of more modern
research into homosexual behavior. Even before scientists began to
question homosexual behavior in terms of its apparent reproductive
uselessness, various individuals developed explanations for its
existence. Perhaps surprisingly, early hypotheses regarding
homosexual orientation, while obviously flawed, provide some
important insights, especially in that early researchers were less
interested than many later scientists in explaining homosexual
behavior in terms of a gay-straight dichotomy.
A. Psychoanalytic Theory
Since Freud believed sex to be "the primary motivating force
behind human behavior," it should be no surprise that he wrote about
homosexuality and its development. 140  Freud's theory, while of
limited value today, is in some ways an important exception to the
general Western tendency to categorize sexual behavior as
homosexual versus heterosexual, although he still saw homosexual
138. This is true except with regard to kin selection theory. See discussion infra Part V.E.
139. The EEA refers to the statistical composite of selection pressures that occurred during
an adaptation's period of evolution responsible for producing the adaptation. See, e.g., John
Tooby & Leda Cosmides, The Psychological Foundations of Culture, in THE ADAPTED MIND 20,
51, 55 (John Barkow et al. eds., 1992). Given the relatively recent transition, in evolutionary
terms, to a settled, agriculturally-based way of life, researchers, in contemplating the potential
adaptiveness of various traits or psychological mechanisms, look to the selection pressures acting
on our species in terms of a nomadic, hunting and gathering existence. Id.
140. See, e.g., JANET SHIBLEY HYDE & JOHN D. DELAMATER, UNDERSTANDING HUMAN
SEXUALITY 403 (7th ed. 2000) (discussing Freud).
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behavior in terms of a "disordered" orientation. 141 According to Freud,
an infant is "polymorphous perverse," meaning that the infant's
sexuality is "totally undifferentiated" and is directed at many different
objects, both "appropriate" and "inappropriate."' 142 As a child matures,
sexuality is increasingly directed toward more "appropriate" objects
(i.e., members of the opposite gender) while the desire for
"inappropriate" objects (i.e., members of the same gender) is
repressed. 143 According to Freud, a gay or lesbian individual is fixated
on an immature stage of development.
144
Freud also discussed how homosexuality might stem from the
negative Oedipus complex, wherein a child "loves the parent of the
same gender and identifies with the parent of the opposite gender."
145
In the process of maturation, a healthy individual will repress the
negative Oedipus complex. A gay or lesbian individual, however, "fails
to repress it and, again, remains fixated on it."146
It is important to note that, "consistent with Freud's belief that
an infant is polymorphous perverse was his belief that all individuals
are inherently bisexual," at least as children.147 His Victorian
understanding of biology, however, prevented him from fully exploring
the ramifications of this idea.
B. Learning Theory
Traditional learning theories in psychology share with
psychoanalytic theories a belief that the development of a homosexual
orientation is the result of experience; learning theorists simply take
the idea further.1 48 Like Freud, however, learning theorists, also
called Behaviorists, failed to realize that the "multidirectional"
sexuality they recognized as inherent in our species is not simply
representative of an immature stage of development (to be supplanted
by a gay or straight sexual orientation), but characterizes our species
throughout life.
141. Sigmund Freud, The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman, in 2 THE





146. Freud, supra note 141.




Behaviorists emphasized the importance of learning in the
development of an individual's sexual orientation. 149 They noted the
prevalence of bisexual behavior both in other species and in humans,
and they argued that rewards and punishments shape the individual's
behavior into predominant homosexuality or predominant
heterosexuality. 150 This argument rests on an assumption that
humans possess an amorphous, undifferentiated pool of sex drive
which, depending on circumstances, may be channeled in any of
several directions.
151
This process could operate through either punishments or
rewards. For example, a person who has early heterosexual
experiences that are extremely unpleasant might develop toward
homosexuality. 152 Likewise, if a person has early homosexual
experiences that are pleasant, the individual may become a gay or
lesbian individual. 153
Of course, the rewards in Western society go overwhelmingly to
heterosexuality. Indeed, society gives very few rewards to
homosexuality and often punishes it. While human sexual behavior is
no doubt determined in part by aspects of the environment, therefore,
the learning approach fails to adequately explain homosexual
behavior. 15 4 In fact, research has indicated that children who grow up
with a homosexual parent are not themselves likely to become gay. 155
In this sense, homosexuality is not "learned" from parents.
C. Biological Theories
In recent years, many researchers have hypothesized that
homosexuality may be caused by certain biological factors. This
research falls under behavior genetics and sociobiology more than




152. Id. at 405.
153. Id.
154. See generally Frederick L. Whitam, The Homosexual Role: A Reconsideration, 13 J. SEX
RESEARCH 1, 1-11 (1977) (postulating that "homosexuality is neither a pathological condition nor
a role, but rather a sexual orientation").
155. See J. Michael Bailey et al., Sexual Orientation of Adult Sons of Gay Fathers, 31
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 124, 124-129 (1995) (discussing a study of fifty-five gay or bisexual
men who supplied information about eighty-two sons aged seventeen years or older. The study
determined that over 90 percent of the sons with discernable sexual orientations were
heterosexual).
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for research, these biological theories have suffered more than their
predecessors from an assumption that an individual must follow one of
two paths: heterosexuality or homosexuality.
1. Heterozygotic fitness theory
In terms of a genetic argument, researchers have suggested
that homosexuality might be analogous to sickle-cell anemia, which
results from a mutation in a pair of genes. 156 The condition affects 1
in 500 individuals of African descent and causes many health
problems, as well as premature death.157 Heterozygous individuals,
however, who have only one sickle-cell gene (rather than two), are well
adapted in that their specific genetic makeup allows them to combat
malaria more effectively than individuals who lack the sickle-cell
gene. 58  Homosexuality, then, could be a consequence of being
homozygous for some sort of "gay" gene pair, a maladaptive result that
contrasts with an adaptive heterozygous combination. 59 According to
this explanation, homosexuals would simply be the unfortunate
inheritors of the "wrong" genes, with no chance for successful
reproduction.
2. Genetic variation theory
Research has shown that homosexuality has a genetic basis.
60
A higher incidence of homosexuality has been found among relatives
of male homosexuals than in the general population.' 61  Indeed,
although rates of homosexuality in the general population have been
estimated at 2 to 7 percent, about 25 percent of brothers of male
homosexuals have been found to be themselves homosexual. 162 The
most convincing evidence concerns twin studies. Concordance rates
for homosexuality are much higher among monozygotic (identical)
156. HYDE & DELAMATER, supra note 140, at 401.
157. Id.
158. Allison Ashley-Koch et al., Sickle Hemoglobin (Hb S) Allele and Sickle Cell Disease, 151
AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 839, 842-43 (2000), available at http://www.cdc.gov/genomics/
hugenet/reviews/sickle.htm.
159. HYDE & DELAMATER, supra note 140, at 401.
160. See, e.g., DREW WESTEN, PSYCHOLOGY: MIND, BRAIN AND CULTURE 468-469 (2d ed.
1999).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 469.
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than dizygotic (fraternal) twins and adoptive brothers.163 This means
that if one monozygotic twin is homosexual, the other has a high
probability of being homosexual. Concordance for homosexuality has
been found to be 52 percent for monozygotic twins, 22 percent for
dizygotic twins, and 11 percent for adoptive brothers. 16 4  Studies
regarding homosexual women confirm this research; concordance for
homosexuality is 48 percent for monozygotic twins, 16 percent for
dizygotic twins, and 6 percent for adoptive sisters.165
That the homosexuality concordance rate is substantially
higher for monozygotic than for dizygotic twins indicates there is a
genetic contribution to an individual's sexual orientation. Clearly,
however, genetics cannot be the only factor involved in the expression
of homosexuality. If genetic factors determined sexual orientation,
there would be a 100 percent concordance rate for monozygotic twin
pairs. These results cast doubt on the sickle-cell analogy explanation,
but are limited in their explanatory power in that individual
differences across members of a given species are the rule rather than
the exception. These findings could very well represent a natural
variation in an adaptive behavior.
3. Prenatal factors
Another area of research concerning a possible biological cause
of homosexuality suggests that homosexuality develops as a result of
certain factors during prenatal development. According to the most
recent theory, homosexuality is caused by a variation in
development. 166 There is a critical time, from the middle of the second
month to the middle of the fifth month of fetal development, during
which the hypothalamus differentiates and sexual orientation is
determined. 16 7 Under this theory, any of several different biological
variations during this period will produce homosexuality. 168
Some evidence has been found to support this theory; severe
stress to a mother during pregnancy does tend to produce homosexual
163. Id. Monozygotic and dizygotic describe what are commonly referred to as identical and
fraternal twins, respectively.
164. Id. (citing J.M. Bailey & R.C. Pillard, A Genetic Study of Male Sexual Orientation, 48
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1089, 1089-96 (1991)).
165. Id.
166. HYDE & DELAMATER, supra note 140, at 383.
167. Lee Ellis & Ashley M. Ames, Neurohormonal Functioning and Sexual Orientation: A
Theory of Homosexuality-Heterosexuality, 101 PSYCHOL. BULL. 233, 233-58 (1987).
168. Id.
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offspring.169 Exposing pregnant female rats to stress produces male
offspring that assume the female mating posture, although their
ejaculatory behavior is normal. 170 The stress to the mother reduces
the amount of testosterone in the fetus, which is thought to produce
homosexual rats.
171
Research with humans, however, has produced mixed results.
No conclusive evidence has been found documenting the effect of
prenatal stress on sexual orientation for either males or females.
172
Furthermore, the explanation based on prenatal factors is informed by
the American conception of a rigid separation between heterosexual
and homosexual individuals and may be limited in this manner.
4. Anatomical factors
Simon LeVay theorized that there are anatomical differences
between the brains of gay and straight individuals, and that these
differences result in different sexual orientations.1 73 After studying
nonhuman primates, LeVay suggested that two specific nuclei in the
anterior hypothalamus 174 would be larger in individuals attracted to
women than in individuals attracted to men.1 75 After examining the
brains of homosexual men and women presumed to be heterosexual,
he found significant differences between gay men and straight men in
certain cells in one of the two nuclei of interest in the anterior portion
of the hypothalamus-it was twice as large in heterosexual men as in
women and homosexual men. 176 Anatomically, then, the hypothalamic
cells of gay men were more similar to those of women than to those of
straight men.177
169. HYDE & DELAMATER, supra note 140, at 402.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. (citing J.M. Bailey et al., A Test of the Maternal Stress Theory of Human Male
Homosexuality, 20 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 277, 277-94 (1991)).
173. Simon LeVay, A Difference in Hypothalamic Structure Between Heterosexual and
Homosexual Men, 253 SCIENCE 1034, 1034-37 (1991).
174. That is, two sets of neurons in the front portion of the hypothalamus; this part of the
brain is responsible for the functioning of the parasympathetic nervous system. The
parasympathetic nervous system supports what might be considered the more mundane
activities that maintain the body's store of energy, i.e., regulating blood-sugar levels, eliminating
waste, and regulating heart rate. The parasympathetic nervous system also regulates sexual
arousal in both male and females. WESTEN, supra note 160, at 96.





LeVay's study has several flaws, however, that call his results
into question. First, the sample size was extremely small: nineteen
gay men, sixteen straight men, and six straight women. 178 This small
sample size was necessary because the brains had to be dissected in
order to examine the hypothalamus, so living individuals could not be
studied. Secondly, all of the gay men in the sample, but only six of the
straight men and one of the straight women, had died of AIDS,
making the groups incomparable in that brain differences could be due
to the neurological effects of AIDS. 179 Also, the gay men studied were
known to have been gay based on records at the time of death, but
LeVay simply assumed that the other subjects were heterosexual 180-
an obvious methodological problem. Finally, lesbian women were
omitted from the study,18' decreasing its generalizability.
5. Hormonal imbalance
One final line of biological research has examined the link
between hormonal imbalances and homosexuality. Researchers have
worked to determine whether the testosterone levels of gay men differ
from those of straight men. These studies have not found any
significant hormonal differences, however.
8 2
Despite these results, some clinicians continue to try and "cure"
homosexuality by administering testosterone therapy. 8 3 This therapy
invariably fails, and in fact seems to result in an increase in
homosexual behavior. 8 4 This probably occurs because androgen levels
are related to sexual responsiveness. 8 5
178. Id.
179. Id at 1036.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. HYDE & DELAMATER, supra note 140, at 383.
183. See Amy Banks & Nanette K. Gartrell, Hormones and Sexual Orientation: A
Questionable Link, 28 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 247, 249-51 (1995) (reviewing the history of research
on the connection between homosexuality and hormones). This article cites the Glass & Johnson
(1944) and Meyer-Bahlburg (1977) tests that attempted to "masculinize" homosexual men with
testosterone treatments. Id.
184. Id. at 249
185. Id. "Androgens" are a class of hormones that promote male sex characteristics.
Testosterone, androstenedione, and DHEA are examples.
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D. A New Direction
Of all the biological research that has been done regarding
sexual orientation, the research in genetics has been the most
promising. What is needed to understand homosexual behavior,
however, is a paradigm that entirely rejects the concept of sexual
orientation altogether. Homosexuality and heterosexuality as
categories are constructions, not necessarily accurate reflections of
reality. The use of these rigid dichotomies, into which modern
Western culture places individuals with regard to their sexual
orientation, is the major problem with much of the work that has been
done in this field.
Fortunately, researchers have increasingly focused on
bisexuals, those individuals whose sexual orientation is directed
toward both men and women. Bisexuality is not rare; indeed, it is
more common than exclusive homosexuality.1 86 Ironically, the gay and
lesbian community has traditionally viewed bisexuals with suspicion
or downright hostility. 8 7 Radical lesbians refer to bisexual women as
"fence sitters," saying that they betray the lesbian cause because they
act straight or lesbian depending on whether it is convenient. 8 8 Some
gays and lesbians even argue that there is no such thing as a true
bisexual. 8 9 Thinking in such a rigid manner, however, has been
counterproductive. The categorization of individuals as bisexual is
limiting, but only because it implies the existence of other categories
(such as homosexual and heterosexual). Instead, we should conceive
of human sexuality as having moved beyond its procreative component
at some point in our evolutionary history. This evolution can be
understood as a result of increased behavioral flexibility, which led to
adaptive sociosexual behavior that both shapes and is shaped by
culture.
Despite American cultural assumptions, it is clear that sexual
orientation has not been viewed as a clear-cut matter (or even a
recognizable concept) across space and time. In seventeenth century
Japan, homosexual liaisons among samurai warriors were extremely
186. HYDE & DELAMATER, supra note 140, at 390.
187. Overview in, BI ANY OTHER NAME: BISEXUAL PEOPLE SPEAK OUT 3 (Loraine Hutchins &
Lani Kaahumanu eds., 1991) [hereinafter Bi ANY OTHER NAME]; Sharon Forman Sumpter,
Myths/realities of Bisexuality, in BI ANY OTHER NAME, supra, at 12-13.
188. Forman, supra note 187, at 12-13.
189. Overview in, Bi ANY OTHER NAME, supra note 187, at 6.
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common (and served to enhance status).190 Homosexuality was also a
normal part of life for educated men in ancient Athens and for
warriors fighting for Sparta. 191 Even today among several different
cultures in Melanesia, homosexual behavior is viewed not only as
natural and normal, but necessary. 192
The Sambia, a warrior tribe in the southeastern highlands of
Papua New Guinea, provide the most famous example. 193 They do not
believe that the male body is capable of manufacturing semen,
necessitating its external acquisition. 194 Oral ingestion of semen by
young male initiates during the course of a decade is therefore
considered essential to mature development.195  Throughout
adolescence Sambian males engage only in homosexual behavior.
196
Once they reach maturity, however, they are required to engage only
in heterosexual sex. This practice emphasizes the important contrast
between sexual identity and sexual behavior; although Sambian men
engage in homosexual behavior for a period in their lives, these men
do not form any sort of homosexual identity. The same could be said
of much of the United States' prison population, among whom
homosexual behavior is famously prevalent. 197 What is important to
note here is that none of the above examples describe exclusively
homosexual behavior; heterosexual and homosexual behavior are the
norm in these cultures. This evidence points to the fact that sexuality
as it is conceived of in the United States today is merely the product of
cultural influences.
190. See, e.g., GARY LEUPP, MALE COLORS: THE CONSTRUCTION OF HOMOSEXUALITY IN
TOKUGAWA JAPAN 52 (1995) ("The list of shoguns, hegemons, and principal daimyo thought to
have been sexually involved with boys reads like a Who's Who of military and political
history ...").
191. Paul Cartledge, The Politics of Spartan Pederasty, in HOMOSEXUALITY IN THE ANCIENT
WORLD 84 (Wayne R. Dynes & Stephen Donaldson eds., 1992).
192. GILBERT H. HERDT & ROBERT J. STOLLER, INTIMATE COMMUNICATIONS: EROTICS AND
THE STUDY OF CULTURE 55-84 (1990).
193. Id. at 53-54.
194. Id. at 58-61.
195. Id. at 56, 65-66 (describing how "men require inseminations and magical ritual
treatments over many years to catch up with females and become strong, manly men").
196. Id. at 57-58.
197. See, e.g., Wikipedia, Prison Sexuality, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prison-sexuality
(last visited June 27, 2005). There is a similar lack of homosexual identity formation among
African American males who engage in homosexual behavior "on the down low." See, e.g.,
Wikipedia, Down Low, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Down-low (last visited June 27, 2005).
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E. Evolutionary Explanations
Most of the work that has been done from an evolutionary
perspective continues to operate on the same assumption that to a
somewhat lesser extent guided earlier psychoanalytic, learning, or
biological theories: that one is either straight or gay. The evolutionary
byproduct theory, for example, simply maintains that a homosexual
orientation is a "vestige" of human evolutionary processes, or an "also
ran" category that continues to pop up. 198 The continuously occurring
mutation theory posits that gays and lesbians carry a mutation,
leading to a "defective" sexual orientation that leaves them chasing
inappropriate sexual partners. 199
As early as 1959, however, evolutionary biologist George
Evelyn Hutchinson became the first to suggest that homosexual
behavior must serve a useful evolutionary function.200 Hutchinson
argued that because homosexual behavior appears to be a biological
constant, manifesting itself in generation after generation in both
human and nonhuman species, and at a rate that far exceeds that of
biological "mistakes," it must serve some useful function.20' He did
not suggest what that function might be, however, and he
conceptualized homosexual behavior in terms of an either/or
position.20
2
Somewhat later, controversial biologist Edward 0. Wilson
proposed in the groundbreaking work Sociobiology the theory that kin
selection 20 3 has shaped homosexuality. 204 Again, however, he applied
the theory in such a way that an individual must be either straight or
gay, not anywhere in between:
198. Paul Vasey, Homosexual Behavior in Primates: A Review of Evidence and Theory, 16
INT'L J. PRIMATOLOGY 173, 173-203 (1995).
199. JIM MCKNIGHT, STRAIGHT SCIENCE?: HOMOSEXUALITY, EVOLUTION AND ADAPTATION
116 (1997).
200. George E. Hutchinson, A Speculative Consideration of Certain Possible Forms of Sexual
Selection in Man, 93 AM. NATURALIST 81, 81-91 (1959).
201. Id.
202. BRUCE BAGEMIHL, BIOLOGICAL EXUBERANCE: ANIMAL HOMOSEXUALITY AND NATURAL
DIVERSITY 168-69 (1999).
203. "Kin selection" describes how a particular set of nonreproductive behaviors, namely,
altruistic acts that increase the survival prospects for relatives, could prove evolutionarily
adaptive in terms of reproductive success for the "helper" individual since the relative carries
some proportion of the "helper's" genes. See ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: WHY WE ARE
THE WAY WE ARE: THE NEW SCIENCE OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 156-188 (Vintage Books
1995) (1994) (providing a thorough discussion of the kin selection theory).
204. EDWARD 0. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY: THE NEW SYNTHESIS 554-55 (1975).
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The homosexual members of primitive societies may have functioned as helpers, either
while hunting in company with other men or in domestic occupations at the dwelling
sites. Freed from the special obligations of parental duties, they could have operated
with special efficiency in assisting close relatives. Genes favoring homosexuality could
then be sustained at a high equilibrium by kin selection alone.
2 0 5
1. Primate Research
Things are not so simple, however. Although generally ignored
by psychology, studies of our closest evolutionary relatives, other
primates, have yielded important clues regarding the origins of
homosexual behavior. Indeed, the widespread nature of primate
homosexual behavior, in both human and nonhuman primate species,
demonstrates definitively that homosexual behavior is not a
historically recent phenomenon. In fact, this behavior can be traced
back to the Oligocene, 20 6 during the evolutionary diversification of the
Anthropoids. 20 7 Because prosimians, a more primitive offshoot of the
Primate order,20 8 do not demonstrate any homosexual behaviors, in
contrast to anthropoids, one can infer that increasing behavioral
flexibility characterized the Oligocene anthropoid primates and led to
evolved homosexual behavior.
20 9
Although no member of any nonhuman primate species has
been known to exhibit an exclusive homosexual orientation, many
species do engage in some homosexual behavior. 210 Primatologists
have examined several different explanations for the existence of
homosexual behavior in primates and have received varying levels of
support for their theories. Each of these explanations will be reviewed
in turn for the sake of completeness, although some of these
hypotheses reflect a gay-straight dichotomy bias.
205. Id. at 555.
206. The Oligocene epoch is part of the Tertiary Period in the Cenozoic Era, and lasted from
about 33.7 to 23.8 million years ago.
207. Vasey, supra note 198, at 195. Anthropoidea (from the latin "human-like") is the
suborder of the order Primates that includes New World Monkeys, Old World monkeys, apes,
and humans. See, e.g., Callum F. Ross, Into the Light: The Origin of Anthropoidea, 29 ANN. REV.
ANTHROPOLOGY 147, 147-49 (2000) (describing anthropoidea).
208. Prosimians, a more primitive offshoot of the Primate order, are generally characterized
by less sophisticated behavioral repertoires and relatively limited cognitive complexity. For an
interesting discussion, see Willem De Winter & Charles E. Oxnard, Evolutionary Radiations and
Convergences in the Structural Organization of Mammalian Brains, 409 NATURE 710, 710-14
(2001).
209. Vasey, supra note 198, at 195.
210. See, e.g., BAGEMIHL, supra note 202, at 269-338.
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a. Abnormal Adult Hormone Hypothesis / Prenatal Hormonal
Hypothesis
Homosexual behavior has long been characterized as a sex-role
atypical for the actor, and therefore the result of the developmental
processes of the opposite sex, as mentioned in the discussion of human
prenatal factors. 211 Studies of Macaca fuscata and M. mulatta,
21 2
however, have not demonstrated any consistent link between either
prenatal or adult hormone levels and sexual behavior.
213
b. Proceptivity-Enhacing and Receptivity-Reducing Hypotheses
Two sociobiological hypotheses have been proposed to explain
the functional significance of female-female mounting among
primates. 214 The proceptivity-enhancing hypothesis proposes that
female homosexual mounting functions to increase the reproductive
success of the mounting female.215  The receptivity-reducing
hypothesis states that females' homosexual mounting represents a
form of "intrasexual competition that minimizes the probability that
rivals are inseminated. '216 Neither of these hypotheses has been
supported by observations of nonhuman primates. 21 7
c. Dominance-Assertion Hypothesis
Homosexual interaction between primates has long been
interpreted as reflecting dominance interactions. 21 8 Mounting has
been viewed as a display of dominance, while being mounted is a
211. See, e.g., BAGEMIHL, supra note 202, at 145-47 (debunking this theory with regard to
ring-billed gulls exhibiting homosexual behavior).
212. Fuscata and M. mulatta are different species of monkeys. Vasey, supra note 198, at
181, 185-86.
213. Vasey, supra note 198, at 182-88.
214. Mounting is the most common form of sexual behavior found among animals in
homosexual contexts. One animal climbs on top of another in a position approximating
heterosexual intercourse, usually from behind in a front-to-back position. Nonhuman primates,
however, often use a face-to-face position-interestingly, this is more common in homosexual
contexts than in heterosexual ones. BAGEMIHL, supra note 202, at 18-19; Vasey, supra note 198,
at 189.
215. Vasey, supra note 198, at 189-190.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. BAGEMIHL, supra note 202, at 107-15; c.f. DEAN HAMER & PETER COPELAND, THE
SCIENCE OF DESIRE: THE SEARCH FOR THE GAY GENE AND THE BIOLOGY OF BEHAVIOR 213 (1994)
(discussing common human attitudes towards animals engaging in homosexual behavior).
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display of submission.219  Observations of nonhuman primates,
however, show that while dominant individuals mounted more often,
the mounting of a dominant by a subordinate individual is not
uncommon.220
d. Practice for Heterosexual Copulation Hypothesis
Researchers have suggested that homosexual behavior
expressed during play interactions may serve as practice for future
adult heterosexual sex.221 Some laboratory evidence supports this
conclusion; however, this hypothesis is flawed in that, in many
nonhuman primates, homosexual behavior continues to be expressed
outside of the play context in adult individuals. 222 In addition, it is
illogical to assume that juveniles engage in sexual behavior in order to
prepare for future adult sexual behavior:
Selection does not act on future outcomes; it acts on aspects of the phenotype that, on
average, have acceptable consequences at the time of selection. The future can never be
an effective cause of the past, and although significant consequences of behavior can be
felt in the future, these future effects are not proximate causes for the action that
happened long before.
2 2 3
Three other hypotheses have been proposed and, unlike those
considered above, are supported by studies of various primate species.
Much of this work has focused on bonobos, 224 who engage in a great
deal of nonconceptive sex as well as homosexual behavior.225
e. Tension-Regulation Hypothesis
Several researchers have shown that a relationship exists
between social tension and anthropoid homosexual behavior. For
219. BAGEMIHL, supra note 202, at 18-19, 107-15.
220. Vasey, supra note 198, at 190; see also BAGEMIHL, supra note 202, at 107-108 (noting
that dominance has "little, if any, explanatory power").
221. BAGEMIHL, supra note 202, at 183-84.
222. Vasey, supra note 198, at 191.
223. Phyllis Dolinhow, Play: A Critical Process in the Developmental System, in THE
NONHUMAN PRIMATES 233 (Phyllis Dolinkhow & Augstin Fuentes eds., 1999).
224. Pan paniscus, sometimes referred to as pygmy chimpanzees, live in groups composed of
mixed-sex and mixed-age members containing 60 or more individuals. BAGEMIHL, supra note
202, at 269-75. Such groups often separate into smaller, temporary subgroups with more fluid
membership. Id. Relative to other species, bonobos possess perhaps the broadest and most
variable repertoire of homosexual behaviors. Id.
225. Id. at 269-73. Homosexual activity is almost as common as heterosexual activity among
bonobos, although no bonobo has ever been observed to engage in homosexual behavior
exclusively. Id. at 273.
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example, work with Papio cynocephalus, Macaca nemestrina, and M.
nigra demonstrates a close temporal association among homosexual
behavior, increased inter-individual tolerance, and reduced aggression
during periods of tension or excitement. 26 Richard Wrangham's work
with bonobos is the most important in this area. He describes genito-
genital (GG) rubbing between females and male-male genital rubbing
as being utilized to "defuse" tense situations. 227 These behaviors
"appear affiliative rather than sexual because they are relaxed and
casual, like grooming."228
f. Reconciliation Hypothesis
Wrangham, as well as several other researchers, has shown
that among bonobos (and chimpanzees) "social relationships after
aggression remain tense until affiliative contact has occurred."
229
Among bonobos, this kind of reconciliation often involves sexual
contact, including "rump-rump rubbing" and genital massage between
adult and adolescent males. 230 In addition, researchers have found
that homosexual mounts among captive Pan paniscus increase
significantly within a fifteen minute period following an agonistic
conflict unrelated to food. 231 This evidence seems to highlight a clear
link between sex and reconciliation in bonobos.
g. Alliance-Formation Hypothesis
A rather large body of data suggests evidence of a relationship
between homosexual behavior and the formation of alliances. Again,
Pan paniscus (bonobos) provides the best example. In Wamba and
Lomako in Africa, homosexual interactions between females occur
regularly; these interactions, which consist of GG rubbing, involve
females with sexual swellings but not necessarily in maximal
tumescence. 232 When a young (recently immigrant) female is involved,
she usually solicits another, perhaps by extending her hand, peering,
or holding the other's knees and shaking. 233 If the other, usually older
226. Vasey, supra note 198, at 192-93.
227. Richard Wrangham, The Evolution of Sexuality in Chimpanzees and Bonobos, 4 HUMAN




231. Vasey, supra note 198, at 193.
232. Wrangham, supra note 227, at 66.
233. Id. at 65.
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female is willing, she rolls onto her back and spreads her legs.234 The
two individuals then embrace, thrust their hips forward, and rub their
clitorises against each other rapidly.235 They commonly make facial
expressions, screams, and clutching movements, suggesting that they
are having an orgasm.23 6 The use of GG rubbing in the development of
social relationships is very clear when a female solicits a particular
older female as a sexual partner; she eventually develops a relaxed
social relationship with this individual.
237
One should note that homosexual sex is also present among
male bonobos, though female examples are more frequent.238 Manson
and his colleagues suggest that this male homosexual contact serves a
bonding function, noting that "two subordinate males, which engaged
in more mounts than any other male-male dyad, may have been trying
to form an enduring alliance against the alpha male."239
It is important to note that the three hypotheses that have
received empirical support (the tension-regulation hypothesis, the
reconciliation hypothesis, and the alliance-formation hypothesis) all
describe sociosexual behavior that works to increase the reproductive
success of an individual in terms of what might be called "social
relationship enhancement." Indeed, the presence of homosexual
behavior as tool for alliance formation is hard to deny in light of the
evidence across time and space discussed above. Just as among
bonobos, in ancient Greece and Japan, as well as among the Sambia in
the twentieth century, homosexual liaisons led to an increase in
prestige and status-a factor clearly linked to reproductive success.
Although bonobos are the very best model we have among
primates for sociosexual behavior and homosexuality in general, many
other species use similar behaviors. 240  For example, male olive
baboons engage in sex-derived greeting behaviors-mounting and
genital manipulation-that seem to function to communicate
commitment to form aggressive coalitions.241 Additionally, female
Japanese macaques engage in homosexual mounting quite frequently,
234. Id.
235. Id.; BAGEMIHL, supra note 202, at 270-71.
236. BAGEMIHL, supra note 202, at 270.
237. Wrangham, supra note 227, at 65.
238. BAGEMIHL, supra note 202, at 272-73.
239. Joseph H. Manson et al., Nonconceptive Sexual Behavior in Bonobos and Capuchins, 18
INT'L J. PRIMATOLOGY 767, 782 (1997).
240. See generally BAGEMIHL, supra note 202 (describing the sexual behavior of hundreds of
species).
241. Manson et al., supra note 239, at 783.
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and no less than eight different types of homosexual mounts have
been identified.24 This homosexual behavior among macaques is
interesting in that the sexual relationship between two females is
exclusive throughout its duration, though the relationship lasts for a
few days at most.
243
2. Research Implications
Homosexual behavior has evolved in various primate species,
including humans, to facilitate the formation and maintenance of
social relationships, especially alliances. By breaking out of the
predominant mode of Western (and especially American) thought that
conceives of homosexuality and heterosexuality as rigid categories, the
"psychological genesis" of homosexual behavior becomes clear. Rather
than "intrinsically disordered," homosexual behaviors appear to be
adaptive tools aimed toward increasing reproductive success, however
distally. Indeed, the evidence indicates that all members of the
species Homo sapiens sapiens are capable of directing sexual attention
to individuals of either sex, though to varying degrees. Because the
increased behavioral flexibility that has evolved in humans has
resulted in the decoupling of sexual behavior from reproduction,
creating sociosexual behavior, the Pope's assertion that homosexuality
is "contrary to natural law" can be easily dismissed. Homosexual
behavior is nothing more or less than one facet of humanity's
sociosexual repertoire.
VI. WHERE WE GO FROM HERE: GAY PERSONHOOD AS A FUNCTION OF
ESTABLISHMENT RATHER THAN SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Even in states where gays are explicitly prohibited from
marrying, many gays who are able to find willing churches and
synagogues are bypassing any legal debate and focusing on the aspect
of marriage that matters to them-its spiritual component. 244 These
religiously observant gay couples have in common with President
Bush and Professor Kohm a view that marriage is primarily a union
in the eyes of God.
And yet marriage is a legal institution as well. Any straight
individual may be married and reap the benefits associated with that
242. Paul Vasey, Intimate Sexual Relations in Prehistory: Lessons from the Japanese
Macaques, 29 WORLD ARCHAEOLOGY 407, 413 (1998).
243. Id.
244. Goodstein, supra notell2, at Al.
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union. These benefits are legal, psychological, and economic, as well
as religious. Even among those for whom marriage is primarily a
spiritual union, the stigma of their coupling's illegitimacy in the eyes
of the law strikes at the heart of their rights as citizens under the
Constitution.
"Sexual orientation is one area where the extra-human sources
of authority of God and/or Nature are often taken to have spoken,
authoritatively declaring heterosexuality normative and
homosexuality deviant. ' 245 But as highlighted in detail above, the
biological reality of our species' complex, sociosexual existence means
that humanity's sexual expression cannot be confined to a narrow set
of "acceptable" behaviors; nor can antigay advocates claim that their
view is supported by the "law of nature." If anything, natural
observation demonstrates the illegitimacy of such artificially-
constructed dichotomies.
Lawrence v. Texas deemed private, consensual sexual activity
by homosexuals to be protected by the Constitution. While
representing an important step towards gay personhood, Lawrence
was just that-a step. Gay personhood under the law will continue to
remain uncertain in the face of antigay advocates motivated by
religious and cultural biases. Because religion is the "purpose" behind
statutes that, among other things, prohibit gay marriage, such laws
must be presumed unconstitutional. Other public policy concerns, of
course, may justify various continuing restrictions on individuals'
sexual behavior-incest or sex with minors, for example, present
dangers unassociated with religion, such as a concern for genetic
defects or an absence of consent, respectively. But to deny individuals
the right to enter into committed relationships with other consenting
adults has no purpose beyond establishing religiously-based moral
values as law.
In Zelman, Chief Justice Rehnquist provided two specific
factors for courts to consider under the effect prong of Lemon in
indirect aid cases. 246 Recall that, to be constitutional under Lemon, a
statute must have (1) a secular legislative purpose; (2) a principal or
245. David B. Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1012 (2002).
246. In Zelmon v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 669 (2002), Justice O'Connor explains in
her concurrence that under the majority's approach,
Courts are instructed to consider two factors: first, whether the program administers
aid in a neutral fashion, without differentiation based on the religious status of
beneficiaries or providers of services; second, and more importantly, whether
beneficiaries of indirect aid have a genuine choice among religious and nonreligious
organizations when determining the organization to which they will direct that aid.
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primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) no
fostering of an excessive entanglement with religion.247 Chief Justice
Rehnquist's "subtest" incorporated his nonpreferentialism standard,
which, applied in the context of indirect aid cases, requires courts to
consider (1) whether the program at issue provides aid neutrally with
respect to religion, and (2) whether the beneficiaries have an actual
choice between religious and nonreligious groups.248
A similar nonpreferentialism modification should be made in
terms of gay marriage or other gay rights. Specifically, under the
"purpose" prong of Lemon, courts should ask in the context of
marriage or sexuality whether (1) the statute's sole or primary
motivation rests in advancing traditional majoritarian religious views
with regard to personal sexual conduct, and (2) whether other
compelling public policy objectives support the legislation's enactment.
The first "sub-prong" articulates a context-specific effectuation of a
modified nonpreferential Lemon standard, while the second, using
familiar language from the Court's substantive due process
jurisprudence, provides for the continued validity of laws outlawing,
for example, incest, polygamy, or bestiality.
Even if the Court eventually decides to eliminate the Lemon
test, the application of a robust version of Justice Rehnquist's
nonpreferentialism alone should be sufficient to render any law that
discriminates against gays unconstitutional. Such laws would be
similarly problematic under Justice Kennedy's coercion standard, in
that coercing conduct is, in some respects, more serious than coercing
belief (which is much more difficult to regulate). O'Connor's
endorsement standard also points towards the unconstitutionality of
any religiously-motivated law that results in discrimination against
gays.
Until the Court indicates otherwise, Lemon will control,
although it will no doubt continue to be applied in a modified, context-
specific form. Such a test, as applied to gays, is in many ways
superior to the Court's judicially-constructed substantive due process
doctrine. Of course, over the years, the Supreme Court has sought to
protect personal conduct related to sex, marriage, child-bearing, and
child-rearing by developing a "right to privacy," which may be more
accurately described as a right to personal autonomy. This "right to
privacy" could be seen as encompassing gay marriage as well;
however, given that any discussion by the Court concerning gay
247. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
248. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 669 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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marriage must, as in Lawrence, analyze a law motivated solely or
primarily by Judeo-Christian-inspired beliefs, the Establishment
Clause may serve as a more stable platform for review.
At the very least, the Establishment Clause could serve to
complement the Court's substantive due process jurisprudence, and
vice versa. The establishment theory advanced in this Note, however,
is superior to the substantive due process approach if only because it
depends on the text of the Constitution, rather than principles outside
it.249 Indeed, under the theory of this Note, much of the Supreme
Court's "privacy" jurisprudence, beginning with Griswold v.
Connecticut, could be supplanted by the Establishment Clause.
Realistically, the Court is unlikely to abandon its substantive due
process jurisprudence, but the concern for morally-inspired legislation
that has so often faced the Court of late is more easily addressed
under an establishment standard.
VII. CONCLUSION
A context-specific modification of the Lemon test applied in the
face of legislation motivated solely or primarily by moral concerns
serves as a more legitimate grounds for judicial consideration than
substantive due process. Although faced with "morality-based"
legislation in Lawrence, the Supreme Court relied on substantive due
process to declare invalid the Texas statute outlawing sodomy. The
Establishment Clause provides a more logical and stable platform for
review in gay rights cases, however, in that its core concern,
preventing religious establishment, applies to issues of gay
personhood directly rather than peripherally, as is the case with
substantive due process. Research regarding homosexual behavior,
both in our species and in others, points to the illegitimacy of rigid
dichotomies with respect to sexual orientation as well as the
fundamental errors inherent in much popular Judeo-Christian
thought concerning what comprises "natural" sexual expression.
Because American jurisprudence does not operate in a vacuum-it is
based in the real concerns of real individuals in a world governed by
249. Another weakness of the substantive due process approach is that it tends to articulate
a right "to be free from" governmental interference with personal autonomy, rather than a right
"to," for example, abortion or contraceptives. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326-27
(1980) (finding no right to Medicaid reimbursement for abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
478-79 (1977) (same). If the debate over gay marriage is conceptualized as a "right to" such
unions, substantive due process may serve, analytically at least, as a particularly suspect
rationale.
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distinct, observable phenomena-such empirical research should
inform any legal discussion. An empirically-based establishment
theory, in addition to improving upon the Court's substantive due
process approach, would bring further stability to the Court's confused
establishment jurisprudence.
Our Republic was founded upon the principles of freedom and
self-determination. As the world changes, and human knowledge and
experience evolve, it is incumbent upon courts to protect those
principles by combating the tyrannical imposition of ancient
prejudices by a majority of often well-meaning, but uninformed,
citizens. Such are the Constitution's requirements, requirements we
ignore at risk not only to a subjugated minority, but to all Americans.
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